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Compensation in Municipal Employment
ABSTRACT
In the private sector. 'unionization' typically refers to employees who
are organized, recognized, and covered by contracts, according to the
procedures established by the National Labor Relations Board. The
municipal sector provides an instructive contrast. There. 'unionizationS
encompasses five mutually exclusive combinations of organizational
structure and labor relations practice. These 'modes' form a hierarchy
of employee power, from strongest to weakest: recognized bargaining
units, unrecognized unions in cities which contain other recognized
unions, unorganized employees in cities which contain recognized unions,
unrecognized unions in cities which contain no recognized unions, and
unorganized employees in cities which contain no recognized unions.
Differences in the effects of each mode on compensation for municipal
employees demonstrate differences in the intrinsic strength of different
union institutions..
Municipal compensation levels are dramatically higher for employees
represented by more powerful modes of unionization, regardless of other
conditions in factor and output markets. Union effects on total compen-
sation, in comparison to its mean, range from 3.8 for unrecognized
unions in cities which contain no recognized bargaining units, to li.8
for recognized bargaining units, themselves.
In addition, union effects on total compensation are reater than
union effects an wages in all modes. Relative union effects on expendi-
tures for paid time not worked and pension benefits are usually more
than twice wage effects, Union effects on medical benefits re nearly
twice wage effects.
Jeffrey 3. Zax
NationslBureau of Economic Research
269 Mercer St., 6th floor
New Vo r< •NewYorh lOO3In October i9BO. municipal qovernments had 2,560,516 full- and part-time
employees (Labor-Management Services Administration), or 2.4 of the
American labor force in that month (Economic Report of the President)
More than half of full-time employees. 53.9. were members of unions or
employee associations (Labor-Management Services Administration). The
size of the municipal sector, and the prominence of unions within it,
have stimulated many studies of these unions and their economic ac-
I
tivity.
In addition, municipal unions provide several comparisons with
unionization in the private sector. Municipal unions may be able to
exercise greater influence over compensation levels than can unions in
the private sector, because they have political as well as economic
power (Wellington and Winter). That ability may be rarely exercised:
current estimates of union wage effects in municipal employment seem to
be modest in comparison to those in private sector employment, both in
the aggregate (Freeman) and in individual functions (Edwards and Ed-
wards, 1982a)
Furthermore, municipal unionization also offers a comparison --
uniquein the American economy --betweendifferent institutions of
labor relations. The strengths of both municipal and private sector
unions may vary with conditions in product and factor markets. Only
municipal unions vary importantly in strength because of differences in
union structure. The opDortunity to study these differences has been
Freeman. and EhrenberQ and Schwarz summarize this literature.iqnored in previous work.
In the private sector, 'unionization' typically refers to employees
who are orqanized, recognized, and covered by contracts, accordinq to
the procedures established by the National Labor Relations Board. Excep-
tions to this characterization are only temporary: new unions still
seeking recognition, and bargaining units whose most recent contract has
lapsed prior to agreement on a successor. Private sector unions are at
once employee associations and representatives of bargaining units. The
bargaining units they represent are legally entitled to binding con-
tracts (Beal, Wickersham and Kienast).
In the municipal sector, 'unionization' encompasses five mutually
exclusive combinations of organizational structure and labor relations
practice. These 'modes' form a hierarchy of employee power. Municipal
compensation levels are dramatically higher for employees represented by
more powerful modes, regardless of other conditions in factor and output
markets. This paper describes the five modes of municipal labor rela-
tions and estimates the effects of each on total compensation levels,
wages and four types of nonwage compensation.
-f
There is no single definition cf unionization' in municipal employment.Municipal employees may be organized by an employee association which is
not recognized as a bargaining unit. They may be represented by a bar-
gaining unit which is not covered by a contract. They may benefit from
employment by a bargaining city, even if they are members of neither a
bargaining unit nor an employee organization.
Accordingly, there is no single measure of unionization among
municipal employees. Unfortunately, previous attempts to analyze the
relationship between unionization in the local public sector and
municipal compensation have not successfully differentiated between weak
and powerful union structures. As examples, Ashenfelter, and Edwards and
Edwards (1982b) use only a dummy variable indicating the presence of a
union. Schmenner, Ehrenberg (1973) and Ichniowski use both this variable
and a dummy for the presence of a contract, though only Schmenner uses
them simultaneously. These studies present only polar concepts of
municipal labor relations. Union membership, by itself, is the weakest
form of municipal unionization. The strongest form is represented by an
enforceable union contract.
These representations, in isolation, ignore two important dimensions
of the relationships between municipal employers and employees. First,
common patterns of municipal organization are intermediate to unioniza-
tion and contractual agreement in sophistication aridinunion power.
Second, union power is 'additive'; distinctive characteristics of weak
municipal labor relations practices are incorporated into stronger
forms, to whose power they contribute.Munc±pai unionization takes on five different forms, each repre-
senting the joint effects of different levels of organization and dif—
ferent bargaining practices.
2
Bargaining -is the most important aspect
of municipal labor relations. Employees in individual municipal func-
tions experience one of three bargaining environments; no bargaining, a
barqaininq city or a barqaining function. Nonbarqaininq functions,
regardless of whether their city bargains, may or may not contain
employee organizations.
Teble i summarizes the levels of organization and the bargaining
practices which define each mode. It also introduces several additional
features of municipal unionization which further distinguish powerful
modes from weak. The distribution of those features across modes
demonstrates that institutions of municipal labor relations become more
sophisticated as bargaining practices become more formal.
Nonunion functions in nonbargaining cities represent the first,
weakest mode of municipal labor relations. Employees in these functions
are unorganized, and are employed by cities which do not bargain with
any of their employees in any function Table 1 confirms that nonbar-
gaining cities in which nonunion functions are found do not enter into
2
State laws impose limits on municipal bargaining and organizational
practices which may vary. No convenient summary of these laws ex-
ists. Therefore, the analysis of this paper does not introduce them
explicitly.




Mean Labor Relations Characteristics
!! 4:2:
Nonunion Union
Function, Function. Nonunion Union
Non- Non- Function, Function,
Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining
Percent - 6O.l - 74.4 69.7
Organized











Number of 0. 0. 1.07 2.67 3.20
Contracts
Number of 0. 0. .43 .98 1.46
Memoranda
Percent 0. 13.4 32.O 34.8
Covered
Number of
Observations 1475 324 454 629 2747
Percent o.
Total 26.2 8.1' 1l.2' 48.8
Notes: These statistics are calculated from the sample described
in the Appendix to this paper. Observations represent police,
fire, sanitation and an aggregate of all other non-educational
functions.
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contractualagreements or memoranda of understandinq with any of their
employees.
Employees who organize, thouqh thecityfor which they work does notbargain, belQnq to the second mode --unionfunctions in nonjarqaininq
cities. Union formation is the first initiative open to employees who
wish to increase their influence. Organized employees may, through
informal interactions with administrators in which their solidarity is
expressed, obtain greater compensation than were they unorganized,
though their union is not legally entitled to bargain.
Unorganized and organized functions, in conjunction with cities that
bargain, form the bases of modes three and four. Bargaining cities are
those in which at least one bargaining unit is recognized, or in which
unrecognized functions are routinely invited to meet-and-confer discus-
sions.As indicated in Table 1, bargaining cities have typically
signed binding contracts, as well as memoranda of understanding.
Nonunion and union functions in bargaining cities represent 39 of
all functions which do not contain a bargaining unit. Employees in these
functions enjoy some of the benefits which accrue to formal nego-
tiations. Some cities may prefer to establish conditions of employment
through a uniform procedure for all functions, whether or not they are
legally entitled to bargain. Many cities may offer unrecognized func-
tions conditions which are similar to those obtained by recognized
Most cities that meet this definition do so because a bargaining
unit has been recognized.
The Surveys of Government, from which these data are taken, report
only total contracts per city. They do not identify the functions
with which contracts are signed.
6
The observations in these modes disproportionately represent sanita-
tion departments. They may regularly profit from the activities offunctions, in order to forestall organization and rec.oqnition drives.
In either case, compensation levels for municipal employees in nonbar
gaining functions are increased because other functions bargain.
Bargaining functions --thefifth mode of municipal labor relations
--representthe apex of employee power. Employees in these functions
are organized, their unions are recognized, and they are entitled to
legally enforceable contracts.These functions are ordinarily respon-
sible for the contracts signed by cities in which they are contained.
Their employees have greater influence than any others over municipal
compensation levels.
Table 1 lists the defining characteristic of bargaining functions,
the presence of a bargaining unit. This table also reveals that recogni-
tion may entail more than the presence of a single bargaining unit.
Municipal bargaining units vary widely in their scope. The broadest
units include all workers in a function, and their supervisors, as well.
Units with more narrow definitions may exclude supervisors, and may even
exclude other 'rank—and-file' employees within the same function. In
this latter case, several such units may coexist. The union status of
supervisors and the presence of multiple bargaining units define dis-
tinctions between municipal employees. These distinctions offer
strategic opportunities in negotiation to both employer and employee.
more highly organized police and fire departments.
7 fl Functionsin which a bargaining unit isrecoqnzedare, by detini-
tion, in a bargaining citySupervisors are represented by bargaining units in one-third of those
functions in which a bargaining unit is present.
8These functions
represent approximately one-sixth of the total. The influence and
sophistication of municipal bargaining units may be increased by the
inclusion of supervisory staff. However, their exclusion from municipal
management may indicate that function employees are alienated from the
city administration. The net effect of supervisor representation on
municipal compensation levels depends on the relative strengths of these
l,_S,_
Twelvepercent of all functions, or nearly one-quarter of functions
with bargaining units, harbor more than one bargaining unit.Municipal
employees at different grade levels may demand separate bargaining
units, for two reasons. First, they reinforce professional hierarchies.
Second, multiple bargaining units create opportunities for negotiations
with different units to demand escalating concessions under the rubric
of 'comparability'. Municipal employers may welcome multiple bargaining
units as presenting opportunities to reduce employee solidarity. As with
supervisory representation, the net effect of mulitiple bargaining units
on municipal compensation depends on the relative advantages of com-
parability over solidarity.
Collective bargaining is the most powerful and the most complicated
8
Supervisory representation is unique to the public sector.
"Managerial employees (in the private sector] are excluded from
coverage of the NLRA (National Labor Relations Act]" (Beal, Wicker-
sham and Kienast, pg. 197).
One function in the sample under study has 44 bargaining units.amonq the fivemodesof municipal labor relations. Only unions which
exercise all the rights to which they may legally lay claim are entitled
to barcain. However, formal bargaining may engender formal divisions
between employees of the same function. These divisions create oppor-
tunities for both employee cooperation and competition in their rela
tions with municipal employers.
Table 2.
Compensation Levels For Five c2P9
Nonunion Union
Function, Function. Nonunion Union
Non- Non- Function, Function,
CompensationBargaining Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining cn
Total 6.01 6.50 6.71 7.46 9.01
Compensation
Pay Per Hour 4,50 4.73 4.94 5.42 6.33
Worked
Pay Per Hour .686 .851 .812 .885 1.17
Not Worked
MedIcal .245 .223 .304 .392 .427
Benefits
Pension .488 .598 .569 .688 .950
Benefits
Miscellaneous .092 .096 .080 .076 .128
Benefits
Notes: Nodes are as defined in text.
Table 2 displays mean values of compensation levels for each mode.
These values support the hierarchy of union power attributed to the five
modes.veraqelevels of total compensation and of all its components --
withthe excepton of miscellaneous benefits are•reaterin functions
-9-which p.rticipste more fullyincollective barqairiinq. Ajronq function-s
with identical access to bargaining those which are organized receive
higher compensation than do those which are not. These differentials.
and their relationship to municipal unionization, are analyzed more
thoroughly in the discussion which follows.
- c4c
Regressionestimates of compensation levels which account for many of
their determinants, in addition to labor relations practices,
demonstrate the effects of municipal unionization predicted above. All
important measures of compensation per hour worked increase with in-
creased engagement in bargaining activity. At any level of bargaining.
compensation is higher in organized than in unorganized functions.
'Union compensation effects' increase monotonically across the five
modes for all measures of compensation with the exception of miscel-
laneous benefits.
The analysis in this section tests the models of municipal labor
relations presented above against the relationships between union
characteristics and compensation levels observed in a large sample of
functions from American cities. This sample is a pooled cross-section
time-series of function-years. Each observation represents one of four
functions (police, fire, sanitation and an aggregate of all other non-
educational functions) in one of three years (1975. 1977 and 1979), in10
one of 889 cities.
Total compensation per hour worked in this sample is comprised of
five components; wages, paid time not worked, medical benefits, pension
benefits and miscellaneous benefits. Levels of these compensation
measures depend upon characteristics of demand for municipal services,
supply of municipal services, and labor supply, as well as characteris—
tics of labor relations. OLS equations discussed here take total compen—
sation and its five components as dependent, and measures of all these
determinants as independent, so as to distinguish their influences. 11
These equations account for compensation determinants other than union
status with thirty-nine measures of population characteristics, alterna-
tive employment opportunities, government structure, function,
qeographic area, and year of observation.
?!easures of the eight labor relations characteristics presented in
Table 1 represent union status in these equations. Four variables --the
percent of employees belonging to employee associations, the presence
and number of bargaining units, and the union status of supervisors --
10
A description of the sample, a complete list of variables, the
complete regressions and their summary statistics comprise the
Appendix to this paper. Zax (1984a) discusses these matters further.
The compensation packages analyzed here are measured in unusual
detail. Previous attempts to estimate the effects of local public
sector unionization on nonwage compensation have relied upon single,
aggregate measures of expenditure. Ichniowski measures fringe
benefits as "city contribution to employees' retirement benefits and
insurance programs". Edwards and Edwards (1982b) use an expanded
measure which additionally includes vacation and sick pay. Bartel
and Lewin use the difference between total expenditures for person-
nel costs and total expenditures for salaries, presumably a number
which is similar to that of Ichniowski,
—ILuminarize union characteristics within individual municipal functions.
Three variables --thenumber of contracts and memoranda of understand-
ing to which the city is a party, and the proportion of all municipal
employees covered by contracts --summarizelabor relations practices
12 within the city as a whole. One variable measures the interaction
between city-wide practices and union status within functions; an in-
dicator for functions without bargaining units, in bargaining cities.
13
The coefficients for these eight variables are presented in Table
They are the basis for the aggregate estimates of mode-specific compen-
sation effects with which this analysis culminates. As a preliminary to
these estimates, the effects of individual union characteristics are
worthy of some notice in their own right. Bargaining practices are more
important than any other aspect of municipal unionization in the deter—
mination of municipal compensation levels. Organization is important in
its own right, as well as a precursor to recognition and bargaining.
Municipal unionization usually elicits larger relative increases in
12The Surveys of Government, from which these measures are taken, do
not collect the number of contracts, the number of memoranda or the
percent covered for individual functions.
13Coefficient estimates for union variables in this specification are
subject to potential biases arising from two different considera-
tions. First, current compensation levels and current union status
may he chosen simultaneously. This bias is limited, here, because
union variables are measured in the year prior to that in which
compensation measures are made. Second, past compensation levels may
determine both current union status and current compensation. This
specification would spuriously attribute the effects of past on
current compensation to current union status. However, if current
unionization is due to low levels of past compensation, such at-
tribution would yield underestimates of union compensation effects.
Effects reported here would be lower bounds. Both sources of bias
are probably best dealt with in panel data sets. Bartel and Lewin
attempt to deal explicitly with these issues in a cross-section
context.nonwage components of compensation then in waqes.
Table 3.a
OLSCoefficients on Measures of Labor
:tPc2 c
Measuresof Total Pay For Pay For Time
'Organized .00416 .00253 .000666
(3.72) (3.53) (1.96)
Presence of Bargaining .612 .242 .201
Unit (5.29) (3.28) (5.73)
Number of Bargaining -.0259 -.000874 -.00603
Units (1.02) (.0540) (.783)
Supervisors in .0446 .0278 -.00696
Bargaining Units (.511) (.499) (.262)
Labor Relations Policy .294 .114 .109
If No Bargaining Unit (2.95) (1.79) (3.59)
Number of Contracts .0583 .0346 -.00207
(3.54) (3.29) (.414)
Number of Memoranda .0255 .00632 .00448
(1.46) (.568) (.846)
of Employees Covered -.00113 .000700 -.000124
By Contracts (.625) (.605) (.226)
Notes: T—statistics are in parentheses.
== = = = = = = = = —_===——== = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = =]
Bargainingfunctions obtain an additional 8.61 in total compensation
per hour worked over the standard in nonbargaining functions. This
differential represents 7.9k of mean total compensation. Emriloyees in
functions which do not bargain can, nevertheless, obtain approxmate1y
half the benefits acquired by those that do if the city for which they
F-tests reect the hypothesis thstoarqaininqunitsand ncnbrcsin-
mo functionsin harosininc cItieshveeuivlent effectson corn-[r r=======rrr=r—_=======—_====
Table3.b







































































Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.
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work bargains. Bargaining cities increase total compensation for
nonbargaining functions by .29 .Totalcompensation increases by $.042
with each increment of ten percentage points in the proportion of
employees who belong to unions.
Municipal union compensation effects are seriously underestimated if
pensation for all compensation measures with the exception of medi-
cal benefits.
Alternative estimations, not reported here1 demonstrate that the
effects of percent organized on compensation levels are estimated at
twice their true magnitudes and significance if equations do not
include variables for the presence of bargaining units and a bar-
gaining environment, Estimates derived from these incorrect
specifications notably exaggerate the actual power of organization.
15
15their effects on nonwage compensation components are ignored. Bargajniriq
functions and bargaining cities display marked preferences for nonwage
compensation. Only 4O of their effects on total compensation are allo-
cated to wages. Thirty—three percent take the form of additional paid
time not worked. Twenty-two percent take the form of increased pension
benefits. Organization, in itself, emphasizes nonwage compensation less.
Even so, 39? of the union effect on total compensation is attributable
to union effects on nonwage components, while these components comprise
only 28 of the total, on average.
Previous analyses of municipal union compensation effects draw
similar conclusions, though they employ less sophisticated measures of
unionization and nonwage compensation. Hall and Vanderportea estimate
that the practice of collective bargaining has greater impact on compen-
sation levels than do signed contracts. Ehrenberg and Goldstein --in
analogy to the effects of bargaining cities --findthat compensation
levels within function depend upon unionization in other functions.
Ichniowski, and Edwards and Edwards (1982b) estimate greater municipal
union effects on nonwaqe than on wags compensation.
These individual effects are interesting, but the principle theme of
this paper is that individual union characteristics do not exist in
isolation. Tables 4 and 5 combine the coefficients of Table 3aridmode-
specific mean values for labor relations variables from Table I to
construct estimates of compensation effects for each of the five pos-
- -= —_========—_ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ======—_ = = = = = == = ]
Table 4.
OLS Union Absolute Effects on





Compensation Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining ct
Total .250 .352 .748 1.06
Compensation
Pay Per Hour .152 .163 .423 .571
Worked
Pay Per Hour .040 .107 .153 .232
Not Worked
Medical .020 .027 .062 .062
Benefits
Pension .041 .056 .117 .185
Benefits
Miscellaneous -.003 -.002 -.008 .012
Benefits
Notes: Nodes are as defined in text. Mode 1 is omitted since, by
definition, no union effect is observed.
sible modes.
16The effect of labor relations in mode i on labor market





Lik represents the mean of labor relations variable k for mode •
representsthe coefficient of labor relations variable k on labor market
16Modes of municipal unionization vary in their efects on compensa-
tion levels because they represent different assortments of union
characteristics, not because these characteristics have effects
which vary. F-tests reject singly and jointly, the hypotheses of
different effects in different modes, for all five measures of labor
relations which appear in more thanonemode; percent organized,
bargaining environment, contracts, memoranda and percent covered.outcome i.
Functionsin all modes which include organization or barqaining
obtain increases in total compensation, compared to levels in mode one,
nonunion functions of nonbargaining cities. All components of compensa-
tion, with the exception of miscellaneous benefits, are increased, as
well. Absolute union effects on all but one measure of compensation
increase across modes. Again, miscellaneous benefits provide the sole
exception.
These estimates provide three interesting comparisons between the
power of union functions and barqaining cities. Union functions achieve
larger compensation increases in bargaining than in nonbargaining cities
--effectsin mode four exceed those in mode two. Compensation is higher
for nonunion functions in bargaining cities than in union functions in
nonbargaining cities effects in mode three exceed those in mode two.
Organization and bargaining cities reinforce each other --theirioint
impacts, as estimated for mode four, exceed the sum of their individual
effects in modes two and three.
Table 5 restates these absolute union effects as percentages of mode-
specific means. The same patterns reappear: relative effects increase in
17
Where comparable, these effects are consistent with the range of
effects summarized in Freeman, and Ehrenberq and Schwarz Total
compensation effects in modes two and five are representative of the
smallest and largest effects reported in previous studies. Nonwaqe
compensation effects for paid time not worked, medical and pension
benefits in mode five are comparable to those recorted by ichTable 5.
OLS Union Relative Effects on
Municipal Compensation Levels For




Compensation Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining
Measure City City City Function
Total 3.84 5.24 1O.O li.
——
L.LU!1
Pay Per Hour 3.21? 3.3O 7.8O 9.Ol
Worked
Pay Per Hour 4.7O' l3.2' l7.3' l9.7'
Not Worked
Medical 9.l2 8.92' 15.8 14.4'
Benefits
Pension 6.81 9.88 17.O 19.4
Benef its
Miscellaneous -2.98k -1.98k -1O.1' 9.4O
Benefits
Notes: Modes are as defined in text. Mode 1 is owitted since, by
definition, no union effect is observed.
£ = = = = = = = = —_====—_== = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =—_===—_
magnitudewith mode.
17
In addition, the strenqths of union effects on
nonwage compensation components become apparent.
Relative union effects on expenditures for paid time not worked and
pension benefit.s are more than twice wage effects in modes 3. 4 and 5;
all modes with either a bargaining unit or a bargaining city. Both
compensation components are nearly twenty percent higher in functions
with bargaining units than they would be in the absence of any labor
relations practices. Union effects on medical benefits in these three
niowski, and Edwards and Edwards (l982b) for qgreqate nonwaqe
compensation.modes are nearly twice waqe effects. The relative effects of unions in
modetwo on paid time not worked, medical or pension benefits are also
greater thanthoseon wage levels.
Table 6.
Aggregate OLS Union Relative and Absolute
2! c22!
Compensation
Measure Absolute Effect Relative Effect
Total .644 8.34k
Compensation
Pay Per Hour .348 6.27
Worked
Pay Per Hour .141 14.6
Not Worked
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Table 6 presents aggregate union absolute and relative effects on
municipal compensation levels. The effect of labor relations in the





Lk represents the sample mean of labor relations variable k. The
18
This aggregate effect is identical to a sum of all mode-specific
effects,with each mode weighted by its share in the sample.qcreqate 8' union effect on totalcompensationis composed of a 6
effect on wages, a 4 effect on miscellaneous benefits, an ll effect on
medicalbenefits and 15 effects on paid leisure and pension expendi-
tures.
III.Conclusion
Municipallabor relations are conducted under one of five mutually
exclusive modes. These modes form a hierarchy of employee power. Union
effects on total compensation and all its components are uniformly
greater in more powerful modes. In particular, union compensation ef-
fects increase as bargaining practices become more formal. Union wage
effects are uniformly smaller than are union effects on any other com-
ponent of compensation, in all modes.
These results demonstrate that outcomes in municipal labor markets
depend significantly upon the level at which municipal unions par-
ticipate. That participation may have several aspects. Compensation
increases associated with municipal unionization are explicable in terms
of supply restrictions, but other evidence indicates that strong unions
can increase employment, as well (Zax). Together, these results suggest
that municipal unions can also alter the conditions of demand for
municipal output, thereby altering the demand for their own services. In
addition, intermode differences in union strength do not explain all
intermode differences in compensation levels. They may be more corn-pletely explained by interactions between labor relations mode and other
determinants of labor market outcomes, such as that with structure of
municipalgovernment (Zax).
These results are provocative, but they do not constitute a complete
explanation of municipal union behavior. That.explanationrequires more
comprehensive empirical models which treat compensation, employment and
union status simultaneously. Comparisons between function-specific union
effects may provide the best perspectives on interactions between
employee unionization, publicness and politicization of output. On the
evidence accumulated to this point, these further studies are worth
pursuing.V-
americanNun:
The municipal labor market measures analyzed here are drawn from three
identical surveys of municipal employment and compensation, conducted in
171q77 ,rr4 qq (nr d P4tt ind nd v?,enR rnr4
Lufkin).These surveys report numbers of full-time employees, standard
work schedules, paid time not worked, and fifteen categories of compen-
sation expenditures for employees in police, fire, sanitation, and all
other noneducational departments. Eight hundred and eighty nine cities
provide complete records for at least one function in one year.
The observations in this study consist of labor market outcomes in
one function, in one year. These observations are pooled across the
three survey years, and across the four functions. The sample which
results contains 5629 function-years.
Several sources provide the variables which appear in this analysis.
The Municipal Yearbook, 1978 (ICMA) reports government structure for
each of the cities in this sample. Censuses of Population and Housing,
1970 and 1980, publish characteristics of city residents and city hous-
ing stock. Data from these sources are specific to individual cities,
but do not vary over functions or years. Annual Surveys of Government
record the characteristics of municipal labor relations. Three of thesemeasures are specific to each city in each year. Five are observed in
eachfunction, in each of the three years.
The complete sample yields six dependent measures of municipal com-
pensation levels and 47 independent variables. The compensation measures
are total compensation, wage payments, payments for time not worked,
expenditures on medical benefits, expenditures on pension benefits, and
expenditures on miscellaneous benefits per hour worked. By definition,
the five component measures sum to the total.
Compensation is measured as municipal expenditures rather than
employee income. This distinction is important with regard to nonwaqe
compensation components. In particular, the relationship between pension
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